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Abstract
In an environment where children’s time has an economic value and employ-
ment opportunities for educated workers are scarce, parental investments in their
children’s education may not be driven entirely by poverty and credit constraints.
We oﬀer evidence that children’s participation in child labor and schooling re-
sponds to economic returns to education in India, which suggests implementing
policies that raise the economic beneﬁts of education - such as creating more high-
skilled jobs and improving the quality of education - in order to lower child labor
and increase schooling.
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1I INTRODUCTION
While poverty, credit constraints, and the absence of social welfare systems are cited as
the major determinants of children’s participation in work and school, these are often not
the most critical determinants of child labor and education in developing economies. Low
economic returns to basic education are a characteristic of several developing countries,
driven not only by a scarcity of employment opportunities for educated workers and the
diﬃculty in securing high-skilled jobs but also by an inferior quality of education in the
majority of schools. In many developing countries, high-skilled jobs are often secured not
by academic merit and experience but rather by economic status and family connections,
making under-privileged parents undermine the value of education. The scarcity and
inadequacy of teachers and schools, inferior teaching facilities, and inaccessible schools
reinforce many parents’ beliefs that education is a worthless endeavor and that their
children are better oﬀ learning skills at work rather than attending school.
In the literature, the relationship between returns to education, child labor, and
schooling has not been suﬃciently explored. The bulk of the theoretical literature on
child labor focuses on poverty and credit constraints as the main causes of child labor
(Basu & Van 1998, Basu 2002, Ranjan 1999). Another strand of the literature examines
the impact of trade on child labor (Jafarey & Lahiri 2002, Edmonds & Pavcnik 2004,
Cigno et al. 2002). Yet another strand investigates the impact of technological changes
on schooling (Foster & Rosenzweig 1996, Dessy & Pallage 2001). Several empirical
studies provide evidence that child labor and schooling are aﬀected by more general
local economic conditions such as economic growth (Barros et al. 1994, Neri & Thomas
2001, Swaminathan 1998), unemployment (Da Silva Leme & Wajnman 2000), and labor
2markets (Duryea & Arends-Kuening 2002, Krueger 2002).
In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between rates of return to
schooling, child labor, and education in India using individual-level household data
from the Employment and Unemployment Schedule of the National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO). After correcting for selection bias using the method developed by
Bourguignon et al. (2001), we ﬁrst estimate the rates of return to primary, middle, high
school, and college education for males and females in each Indian state for four years
- 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999. We then estimate how participation in child labor and
schooling responds to rates of return to primary and middle school. Our results indicate
that participation in child labor falls for both boys and girls in response to higher rates
of return to education. However, schooling only amongst boys increases in response to
higher rates of return to education.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II provides a brief background
on child labor and education in India. Section III describes the data and Section IV
outlines the empirical analysis. Section V presents the empirical evidence and Section
VI described our robustness checks. Section VII concludes.
II CHILD LABOR & EDUCATION IN INDIA
1. Variation in Child Labor & Education
As Table 1 in the Appendix shows, India is characterized by vast disparities in literacy
rates across gender, urban and rural regions, castes, and states. Table 3 in the Appendix
illustrates variation amongst India’s states and union territories with respect to child
labor and schooling. In 1999, 54% of children in Gujarat were engaged in child labor
(deﬁned as the proportion of hours children spent in market work, household enterprise
3work, or domestic activities) while child labor in Himachal Pradesh was only 7%. In
1999, schooling (deﬁned as the proportion of hours children spent attending school) was
highest in the state of Kerala at 94% and lowest in Bihar at 51%.
While urban-rural and male-female diﬀerences in child labor and schooling are sig-
niﬁcant in India, these gaps have been diminishing over time. Table 4 in the Appendix
shows an urban and male bias towards more schooling and less child labor compared
to rural and female children. While schooling has been increasing from 1983 to 1999,
our data shows an increase in child labor between 1983 and 1988 followed by a decrease
from 1988 until 1999.
2. Legislation on Child Labor & Education
Despite the existence of anti-child labor and compulsory education legislation in In-
dia, these laws are rarely enforced.1 Opposition from employers and parents of child
laborers creates political pressures that discourage enactment of these laws, which are
summarized in Table 2 in the Appendix. The Child Labor Prohibition & Regulation
Act (August, 1986) prohibits the employment of children below the age of 14 in certain
occupations and processes, while regulating work conditions in other jobs.2 Because
this law only covers factories with more than 10 workers and since most children work
in the informal sector and in unregistered factories with less than 10 workers, they are
not protected by it. Children working in factories with over 10 workers are usually not
1Child laborers, according to the International Labor Organization and the Indian Census, consist
of children in the age group 5-14 years who are economically active (i.e. those who earn a wage or
whose labor results in output for the market.
2Children are prohibited from employment in bidi-making; carpet-weaving; cement manufacturing;
cloth printing, dyeing, and weaving; match manufacturing; explosives and ﬁreworks; mica cutting
and splitting; shellac manufacturing; soap manufacturing; tanning; wool cleaning; and building and
construction work. Children are also prohibited from working on railway and port premises.
4recorded in the register. Employers who violate this law are required to pay a small
ﬁne, after which they continue to employ children.
With respect to education, article 45 of the Indian Constitution declares that ‘the
State shall endeavor to provide free and compulsory education for all children until they
complete the age of 14 years’.3 However, given the widespread notion in India that it
is not essential for all children to be educated, it is almost impossible for the State to
monitor school enrollment and attendance.
III DATA SOURCE
The individual level data used in this study comes from the Employment and Unem-
ployment Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), administered
nationally by the Government of India. The Employment and Unemployment Sched-
ules are administered every ﬁve years in four sub-rounds, each with a duration of three
months.4 An equal number of households are allotted for survey during each of these
four sub-rounds. We use the NSSO surveys for the years 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999,
which are the only years for which data is electronically available. The data set con-
sists of a time-series of cross-sections since diﬀerent households are surveyed every year.
Households are selected via stratiﬁed random sampling.5 The NSSO survey includes
3India’s education system consists of primary (grades 1-5), middle (grades 6-8), secondary (grades
9- 10), and higher secondary (grades 11-12) education. Primary education is a shared responsibility
of state and central governments though state governments are the main actors responsible for the
allocation of educational inputs at the local level. The majority of primary schools are public schools
funded by state governments. Private schools are either aided or unaided. Aided private schools are
privately managed but are ﬁnanced, almost exclusively, by state governments.
4The four sub-rounds are from July to September, October to December, January to March, and
April to June.
5The survey covers the entire Indian Union except for certain inaccessible regions. Villages within a
district are selected on the basis of their accessibility. For example, in the 1999 survey, the entire Ladakh
and Kargil districts of Jammu and Kashmir, interior villages of Nagaland located beyond 5 kilometers
5household and individual level data - household size and composition, social group, reli-
gion, income, assets, indebtedness, demographic variables (age, gender, marital status),
education participation and attainment, and a detailed employment section on principle
and subsidiary activities (industry, occupation, type and amount of income earned, and
intensity of each activity).
IV EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we outline our empirical analysis to examine whether or not children
are less likely to work and more likely to attend school in response to higher returns to
education. We expect returns to education to lower child labor and increase schooling
primarily via the following mechanism: parents’ expectations of the future returns to
investing in their children’s education aﬀect their present educational investments in
their children. If present returns capture future returns to education then parents’
decisions to send their children to work or school could respond to present economic
returns to education.
1. Estimating Returns to Education
We ﬁrst estimate separate earnings regressions for males and females in each Indian state
(25 states and 6 union territories) for four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999). Using
data for the adult population aged 15 years and above, we estimate earnings regressions
after correcting for selection bias using the method developed by Bourguignon et al.
of a bus route, and some inaccessible villages of Andaman and Nicobar Islands were excluded. The
number of sample households surveyed within a village or town is chosen on the basis of its population.
Households are ﬁrst listed and then divided into two groups, aﬄuent and non-aﬄuent households,
based on monthly expenditure levels (urban) and ownership of certain items (rural). A ﬁxed number
of households within each group are then randomly selected.
6(2001) since non-zero wages are reported for only a sub-sample, i.e. individuals engaged
in regular salaried or wage employment. If the selection of this sub-sample of individuals
is random, then the estimates of an ordinary least squares earnings regression will be
consistent and unbiased. If, however, the selection of this sub-sample is systematic -
i.e. the error terms in the selection regression and the earnings regression are correlated
- then ignoring the non-random nature of the sample will introduce a selection bias.6
A multinomial logit model is used to estimate the selection process, which is modeled
as having four possible outcomes: (1) non-participation in the labor market, (2) unem-
ployment, (3) self-employment, and (4) wage employment. The selection bias correction
terms are calculated from the selection regression and included in the earnings regression
to correct for the selection bias.7
Consider the following equations for the earnings regression (Equation 1a) and the
selection process into wage employment (Equation 1b):8
ys = xsβs + µs (1a)
y
∗
s = zsγs + ηs (1b)
where ys is earnings (the outcome variable) and y∗
s is employment status (the selection
variable) and s is a categorical variable representing an individual’s choice between M
alternatives, s = 1,...,M. The variables xs and zs are exogenous, where xs is a subset of
zs in order to identify the earnings equation.9 The error term in the earnings regression,
µs, has E (µs|x,z) = 0 and V (µs|x,z) = σ2.
6See Kingdon & Unni (1998) and Duraiswamy (2000) for similar studies on the Indian labor market.
7We include the details of the correction for selection bias in the Appendix.
8The i subscript for individuals is suppressed.
9The appropriate identifying variables as suggested by labor supply theory are an exogenous source of
non-labor income to capture household need and variables such as parent’s education to capture family
background. In the absence of data on non-labor income and parent’s education, alternate identifying
7To obtain consistent estimates of β4, since the observed outcome belongs to category
s = 4, Bourguignon et al. (2001) propose estimating the following model:
y4 = x4β4 + λ + ν4 (2)













and the error term ν4 is orthogonal to all other terms on the RHS and has zero expec-
tation.10
Earnings regressions are estimated using a standard semi-logarithmic speciﬁcation
following Mincer (1970):
lny4 = x4β4 + λ + ν4 (4)
Earnings regressions are estimated separately for males and females in each of 31 states
and 4 years. This gives us a total of 248 earnings regressions (2 x 31 x 4). The return
to education level e for gender g in state j and year t is calculated as:
Returnegjt = βegjt − βe−1,gjt (5)
variables have been used in this analysis. Household need is captured by the total area of land owned
by the household, whether or not the individual is married, and the size of the household. These
three variables are expected to aﬀect participation in wage employment but not wages earned. The
variables included in xs are four dummies to capture an individual’s highest level of education (primary,
middle, high school, or college, where the omitted category is no education), an individual’s age and
age-square, dummies for an individual’s caste (low-caste/high-caste), religion (Muslim/non-Muslim),
and sector (urban/rural), three season dummies (the omitted season is from July to September) to
capture when the individual was surveyed, and the local unemployment rate. The variables included
in zs consist of all those in xs and the total area of land possessed, whether or not the individual is
married, and the household size.
10Refer to Equation 25 in the Appendix for details.
8where βegjt is the coeﬃcient for the dummy for education level e for gender g in state j
and year t in the earnings regression. The subscript e represents primary, middle, high
school, and college education (e = {p,m,h,c})11, gender g can be male or female, state
j represents India’s 31 states, and t represents four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999).
The rate of return to education level e captures the additional log of hourly wages earned
by an individual with education level e compared to an individual with education level





where Y earse represents the number of years required to complete education level e
(ﬁve years for primary school, 3 years for middle school, four years for high school, and
3 years for college).
2. Returns to Education, Child Labor, & Schooling
We estimate participation in child labor and schooling using the rates of return to
primary and middle school as the key independent variables for boys and girls aged
5 to 14 years. The returns to education capture both inter-state and inter-temporal
variation. Household- and individual-level controls are included as well as year and
state dummies. Because aggregate variables (returns to education) are used to estimate
individual outcomes (participation in child labor and schooling), the standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the year-state level (Moulton 1990).
Two points should be noted. First, we estimate the impact of present rather than
expected rates of return to education on child labor and schooling. In the absence of
11High school consists of secondary school (grades 9 and 10) and higher secondary school (grades 11
and 12).
9a measure of expected returns, present returns to education represent some signal of
returns to education in the future. Second, rates of return to education not only in
a child’s state of residence but also in other states could aﬀect his participation in
child labor and schooling. Even though inter-state migration is relatively low in India
(due to language barriers), education provides individuals with greater mobility in labor
markets. Yet, returns to education in one’s own state may be the only signal individuals
have of employment opportunities for educated workers. An extension to our analysis
could include the rates of returns to education not only in one’s own state but also in
neighboring states as explanatory variables.
Because the dependent variables for participation in child labor and schooling are
both binary, we estimate binary probit models. The probit model assumes that there
is a latent variable y∗
ikjt that can be expressed as a linear function of variables that




ikjt = βXikjt + εikjt (7)
where Xikjt is a set of explanatory variables for child i in household k, state j, and year
t, β is the vector of coeﬃcients that are estimated, and εikjt is an error term. The latent
variable y∗
ikjt is unobservable and instead a dummy variable is deﬁned as yikjt = 1 if a









The probit model assumes that the error term εikjt is distributed according to the
cumulative normal distribution function. Therefore, the probability of a child partici-
10pating in child labor (attending school) Pikjt can be written as:









where t is a standardized normal variable. Maximum likelihood estimation produces
coeﬃcient estimates.
3. Variables
3.1. Dependent Variables - Child Labor And Schooling
Our sample includes children aged 5 to 14 years to adhere to the ILO’s deﬁnition of child
labor. Children working in the market or household enterprise and those engaged in
domestic duties are deﬁned as child laborers for the purpose of this analysis.12 Children
who attend an educational institution are deﬁned as attending school.
The dependent variable ChildLabor − ftptikjt reﬂects a child’s employment status
and equals 1 if he/she is reported as working full time or part time during the past 7
days and 0 otherwise.13 The dependent variable School−ftptikjt reﬂects a child’s school
enrollment status and equals 1 if the child attended school full time or part time during
the past 7 days and 0 otherwise. The Appendix includes Table 5 which describes all the
variables and Table 6 which provides descriptive statistics.
12Regression results don’t vary signiﬁcantly when children engaged in domestic work are excluded
from the deﬁnition of child labor (see Section 2.1.). We include children engaged in domestic duties as
child laborers because domestic duties constitute ‘work’ rather than ‘leisure’. Domestic work includes
mostly cooking, cleaning, and taking care of younger siblings.
13Where i indexes the I children in our sample, k indexes the K households, j indexes the J states,
and t indexes the year.
113.2. Independent Variables
Our key independent variables are the rates of return to primary and middle school.
Rateegjt represents the rate of return to education level e (e = {primary,middle}) for
gender g (male or female), state j, and year t. The rate of return to education level e
captures the additional log of hourly wages earned by an individual with education level
e compared to an individual with education level (e − 1), per year of education level e.
The control variables in the empirical estimations can be divided into three categories
- household demographic characteristics, household economic conditions, and individual
child-speciﬁc controls. Year dummies and state dummies are included to capture time-
variant and state-speciﬁc eﬀects. Also, season dummies are included to capture when
the individual was surveyed.14
Household demographic characteristics include the number of children in the house-
hold (Childrenkjt), four dummies each to capture the father’s education level (F −
Primary, F − Middle, F − High, and F − College) and the mother’s education level
(M − Primary, M − Middle, M − High, and M − College), and dummy variables
that capture whether the household is urban (Urbankjt), low-caste (Lowcastekjt), and
Muslim (Muslimkjt).15 The number of children in the household is included to capture
the idea that families with more children have fewer resources to educate each child,
in other words the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. The education levels of the father and
14The omitted year is 1983, the omitted state is Delhi, the nation’s capital, and the omitted season is
Season1, from July to September. The other seasons are Season2 from October to December, Season3
from January to March, and Season4 from April to June.
15Only households where a father and mother are both present are included in our sample to allow
us to estimate the impact of both the father’s and mother’s education on participation in child labor
and schooling. An alternative is to include all households and examine the impact of the education
level and gender of the household head on child labor and child schooling. The omitted category for
the parent’s education dummies is less than primary or no formal education.
12mother are included because parents with higher education have greater value for edu-
cation and are more likely to educate their children than uneducated parents. Work and
school decisions for children might be considerably diﬀerent for those in urban and rural
regions. Agricultural activities in rural areas might make children more likely to work
on the household farm. We include low-caste and Muslim dummies to capture possible
discrimination against these groups.
Since poverty and credit constraints have been shown to be the major causes of
child labor, we control for household economic conditions and include the log of house-
hold monthly per capita consumption expenditure (LogExpenditurekjt), adjusted to
1988 Rupees, a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the household owns land
(Assetkjt), and a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the child’s mother works
outside the household (WorkingMotherkjt).16 Wealthier households are more likely to
send their children to school rather than work. Ownership of assets indicates that a
household is relatively wealthy and should decrease the likelihood of child labor and
increase the likelihood of schooling. However, household ownership of land, especially
in rural areas, could increase a child’s likelihood of working because children are more
likely to be engaged in agricultural activities (seasonal or full time) if their parents own
and cultivate land. When the mother works outside the household, a child is more
likely to be engaged in domestic chores like cooking and taking care of younger siblings,
especially in the case of female children. On the other hand, if the mother works, the
16We face several problems with the expenditure variable. First, household monthly per capita
consumption expenditure (LogExpenditurekjt) is endogenous since it includes wages earned by children
in calculating household expenditure. Second, household expenditure is calculated using an abbreviated
list of items in 1999 compared to the three previous years. Therefore household expenditure is lower in
1999 compared to 1983, 1988, and 1993. We exclude this variable as an explanatory one as a robustness
check (see Section 2.3.) and ﬁnd that our results remain robust.
13household could be less dependent on earnings from child labor, making child labor less
likely and schooling more likely.
Individual child-speciﬁc controls include the child’s age (Ageikjt), the square of
his/her age (Agesqikjt), and a gender dummy (Maleikjt). In most empirical studies on
child labor it has been found that older children are more likely to work than younger
children and that this eﬀect diminishes with a child’s age. Older children are more likely
to work because they tend to be more productive than younger children and therefore
earn higher wages than younger children. Moreover, older children are sent to work
to support younger siblings. In many developing countries, educating sons are given
priority over educating daughters. In India, traditional gender roles still persist, even
though these are becoming weaker. A boy’s education improves his income-earning po-
tential while a girl’s education is often considered worthwhile only because it improves
her marriage prospects.
We include interactions of all the independent variables with the gender dummy to
incorporate diﬀerent eﬀects of each independent variable on participation in child labor
and schooling for boys and girls.
V RESULTS
1. Overall Signiﬁcance
Before discussing results of individual variables, some indication of the overall predictive
performance of the model is useful. Table 1 reports results of the likelihood ratio test for
the restricted and unrestricted regressions.17 The likelihood ratio test results indicate
17The restricted regression includes all the independent variables discussed in Section 3.2. except
the rates of return to primary and middle school while the unrestricted regression includes the rates of
return to primary and middle school. The likelihood ratio (LR) test has the following null and alternate
14that the rates of return to primary and middle school are signiﬁcant determinants of
participation in child labor and schooling for all groups of children.
2. Rates of Return to Education
Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix report marginal eﬀects and robust standard errors for the
binary probit models for participation in child labor and schooling after correcting the
standard errors for clustering at the year-state level. The impact of the rates of return
to education on participation in child labor and schooling are summarized in Table 2.
The coeﬃcient for boys is calculated as the sum of the coeﬃcient for all children and
the interaction term with the male dummy. The signiﬁcance level for boys is based on
the Wald test with the null hypothesis that the sum of these coeﬃcients is zero.
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between increases in the rates of
return to primary and middle schooling and declines in child labor. The magnitude
of this relationship is large. For girls, a 1% increase in the middle to primary school
wage ratio per year of middle school is associated with a 10 percentage point decline in
child labor. For boys, a 1% increase in the primary to no school wage ratio per year
of primary school is associated with a 44 percentage point decline in child labor and
a 1% increase in the middle to primary school wage ratio per year of middle school is
associated with a 5 percentage point decline in child labor.18
hypotheses:
HO : βe = 0,HA : βe 6= 0
for e = {p,m}. In other words, the null hypothesis is that the restricted regression is correct while the
alternate hypothesis is that the unrestricted regression is correct. The LR test statistic is calculated
as 2(LogLikelihoodUR − LogLikelihoodRR), which has a chi-square distribution. With 4 degrees of
freedom (4 restrictions) the critical chi-square is 13.28 at the 1% level of signiﬁcance. A *** indicates
that the LR test statistic is greater than the critical chi-square value and therefore the null hypothesis
is rejected at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
18The coeﬃcient on the rate of return to education level e measures the change in probability that
15We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between increases in the rates of return
to primary and middle schooling and increases in schooling for boys. A 1% increase in
the primary to no school wage ratio per year of primary school is associated with an
almost 47 percentage point increase in schooling while a 1% increase in the middle to
primary school wage ratio per year of middle school is associated with a 13 percentage
point increase in schooling amongst boys.
The gender diﬀerential observed in Table 2 can perhaps be attributed to the persis-
tence of traditional gender roles in India. Though womens’ participation in the work
force has been steadily increasing over time, conservative and orthodox beliefs persist in
many regions in India. While education is expected to improve a boy’s income-earning
potential, for many girls education is expected to improve only her marriage prospects.
Also, while sons are expected to provide for their parents, daughters are not. Therefore,
boys’ participation in both child labor and schooling respond strongly to higher beneﬁts
to their education in the labor market.
3. Year Dummies
Coeﬃcients of the year dummies capture trends in participation in child labor and
schooling for boys and girls. As Table 3 shows, child labor and schooling are both higher
in 1988, 1993, and 1999, compared to the omitted year, 1983. From 1988 onwards,
child labor has been decreasing and schooling increasing. The coeﬃcient for boys is
a child works (attends school) with a 1% increase in the wage ratio of education level e to education



















where P is the probability that a child works (attends school).
16calculated as the sum of the coeﬃcient for all children and the interaction term with
the male dummy. The signiﬁcance level for boys is based on the Wald test with the null
hypothesis that the sum of these coeﬃcients is zero.
The year dummies capture a decreasing trend in child labor and an increasing trend
in schooling between 1988 and 1999. These trends are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for boys and
girls. Between 1988 and 1999, child labor has declined by 8 (4) percentage points and
schooling has increased by 14 (10) percentage points amongst girls (boys). The year
dummies could be capturing changes in education policies, for example free primary
education and the provision of school meals. Perhaps education policies have a stronger
eﬀect on girls rather than boys because the base is lower for girls - i.e. child labor was
higher and schooling was lower amongst girls to begin with. Therefore, there is more
scope to lower child labor and increase schooling amongst girls than boys. Cultural
changes could also be playing a role in increasing schooling, especially amongst girls.
The trends captured by the year dummies are reﬂected in actual changes in the
proportion of children participating in child labor and schooling between 1988 and 1999.
Table 4 reports these changes.19
4. Control Variables
The control variables have the expected signs (except for a child’s age) and are mostly
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We ﬁnd that a higher number of children in the household makes a child more likely
19The ﬁgures reported are the total number of hours spent working (market work, household enter-
prise work, and domestic work) or attending school as a percentage of the total number of hours spent
in all activities (including hours spent doing nothing - i.e. neither work nor school) in each group (boys
or girls). The ﬁgures remain almost identical if we calculate the number of children engaged in work
or school as a proportion of all children in each group (boys or girls).
17to work. However, the number of children in a household is not a signiﬁcant determinant
of a child’s participation in school. All children are less likely to work and more likely
to attend school if their father and/or mother have completed primary, middle, high
school or college. Two observations are interesting. First, the father’s education has
a stronger impact on childrens’ participation in work and school than the mother’s
education. Second, both parents’ education has a stronger impact on participation in
child labor and schooling for girls than for boys. Thus, our results indicate that parental
education increases educational investments in girls more so than in boys.
Children residing in urban regions are less likely to work and more likely to attend
school. This urban bias is stronger for girls than for boys. In other words, the diﬀerence
in participation in child labor and schooling between urban and rural girls is much larger
than the diﬀerence between urban and rural boys. Being lowcaste or Muslim increases
the likelihood of child labor and decreases the likelihood of attending school for both
boys and girls, reﬂecting the widespread discrimination against these groups.
All children are more likely to work and less likely to attend school if his or her mother
works outside the home. This eﬀect is particularly strong for girls and can be explained
by the fact that working mothers often take their children, especially daughters, with
them to work or make their daughters perform household chores while they work. A
higher log of per capita monthly household expenditure makes a child less likely to work
and more likely to attend school. Ownership of land has a negative impact on boys’
participation in child labor and a positive impact on both boys’ and girls’ participation
in schooling.
There is a U-shaped (inverted-U-shaped) relationship between age and child labor
(schooling) - a child is less (more) likely to work (attend school) from the ages of 5 to
189 and then more (less) likely to work (attend school) from the ages of 9 to 14. In most
of the empirical literature on child labor, older children are found to be more likely to
work.
We ﬁnd that boys are more likely to work than girls. Thus, after controlling for the
indirect eﬀect that being male has on participation in child labor and schooling, via
household and individual characteristics, the direct eﬀect of being male is the opposite
of what we expected.
VI ROBUSTNESS
Table 2 shows the empirical evidence we ﬁnd to validate the main predictions of our
theory for the case of India. In response to higher rates of return to education child
labor falls and schooling increases. In this section we show that our results are robust
to a variety of speciﬁcations and robustness checks.
1. Overcorrection of Standard Errors
The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are obtained after correcting the standard errors
for clustering at the year-state level. According to Moulton (1990), when estimating the
impact of aggregate variables on individual outcomes, unobservable characteristics at
the aggregate level can aﬀect all observations within a cluster and inﬂate the statistical
signiﬁcance of the aggregate variable. In our case, the rates of return to primary and
middle school are calculated for each state in each year. Therefore, correlations within
each year-state combination must be accounted for. Correcting the standard errors for
clustering at the year-state level provide us with an estimator of the variance covariance
matrix which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern within states over
19time. One drawback to this procedure, however, is that the standard errors are over-
corrected. The over-correction occurs because all the intra-cluster correlations (i.e. the
correlation within every year-state combination) are assumed to be signiﬁcant. Without
this correction, all intra-cluster correlations are assumed to be insigniﬁcant. In reality,
correlations within some clusters are signiﬁcant while others are not. Therefore, the
true variance covariance matrix lies in-between these two extreme cases.
Without correcting the standard errors for clustering at the year-state level, the rates
of return to education are found to be far more signiﬁcant determinants of participation
in child labor and schooling. The results are reported in Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix
and summarized in Table 5.
When we don’t correct the standard errors for clustering at the year-state level
for both boys and girls, participation in full time or part time work and school respond
strongly to changes in the rates of return to both primary and middle school. The results
reported in Table 5 represent one extreme assumption (that the intra-cluster correlation
within every cluster is insigniﬁcant) while those presented in Table 2 represent the other
extreme (that the intra-cluster correlation within every cluster is signiﬁcant). The true
variance covariance matrix lies in between these two extreme cases.
2. Other Robustness Checks
2.1. Children Engaged in Domestic Chores
In this section, we exclude children engaged in domestic chores from our deﬁnition of
child labor and include only those engaged in market or household enterprise work. We
do this in order to keep to the ILO’s deﬁnition of child labor. The results are reported in
Table 11 in the Appendix and summarized in Table 6. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decrease in
20child labor amongst girls brought about by higher rates of return to middle school and
a signiﬁcant decrease in child labor amongst boys in response to higher rates of return
to primary school.
2.2. Full Time Work, Full Time School, and Part Time Work and School
To test the robustness of the empirical results, we use three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
child labor and schooling. The dependent variable ChildLabor − ftikjt equals 1 if a
child is reported as working full time during the past 7 days and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
School−ftikjt equals 1 if a child attended school full time during the past 7 days and 0
otherwise. ChildLabor−School−ptikjt equals 1 if a child was engaged in both work and
school part time during the past 7 days and 0 otherwise. Tables 12, 13, and 14 in the
Appendix report marginal eﬀects for the binary probit models for participation in child
labor and schooling while the results are summarized in Table 7. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
decrease in part-time work and school amongst girls as a result of higher rates of return
to middle school. In response to higher rates of return to primary school, boys are less
likely to engage in full time work, more likely to engage in full time shcool, and less
likely to engage in part-time work and school.
2.3. Endeogeneity of Per Capita Household Expenditure
As an additional robustness check, we exclude the variable LogExpenditurekjt because
per capita household expenditure could be endogoenous. In other words, a child’s par-
ticipation in work could raise household income, household expenditure, and thereby
per capita household expenditure. Omitting this variable from the right hand side does
not signiﬁcantly change the results. Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix report the re-
21sults, which are summarized in Table 8. Higher rates of return to middle school lower
participation in child labor amongst girls while higher rates of return to primary school
lower child labor and increase schooling amongst boys.
2.4. Including the Rates of Return to High School & College
One can argue that in deciding whether to send their children to primary or middle
school or to work, parents respond to the returns to high school and college as well. This
argument is based on the fact that a child’s completion of primary and middle school is
necessary before he or she attends high school or college. To check the validity of this
argument we include the rates of return to high school and college as determinants of
participation in child labor and schooling. The results are reported in Tables 17 and 18 in
the Appendix and summarized in Table 9. We ﬁnd that the rates of return to high school
and college are statistically insigniﬁcant in determining participation in child labor and
schooling. Moreover, when the rates of return to high school and college are included as
explanatory variables, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant association between the rates
of return to primary school and child labor amongst boys and a positive and signiﬁcant
association between the rates of return to primary school and schooling amongst boys.
VII CONCLUSION
The empirical results presented here indicate that higher rates of return to education de-
crease child labor and increase education amongst boys and decrease child labor amongst
girls. The rate of return to primary school has a strong impact on boys’ participation
in child labor and schooling while girls’ participation in child labor responds to changes
in the rate of return to middle school. In light of these results, policies that raise the
22returns to education can have a beneﬁcial impact on human capital investments in India
by providing parents with the correct incentives to educate their children. Such policies
can be used to complement anti-child-labor and compulsory education laws.
One way of raising the returns to education is by increasing the demand for skilled
labor via the creation of skilled-labor-intensive employment opportunities. Amongst
the policies that can be used to expand employment opportunities for educated workers
and raise the beneﬁts to obtaining an education are the liberalization of trade and
investment. Rather than lower the demand for skilled labor, as the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem predicts, trade liberalization in developing countries can increase the demand
for skilled labor via the transfer of skill-biased technology. A greater demand for skilled
labor can raise the returns to education and foster greater investment in human capital.
Without incentives for ﬁrms to invest in skill-biased capital, however, trade liberalization
may be insuﬃcient to generate skill-biased investment by ﬁrms.
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26Table 1: Likelihood-Ratio Test
Dependent Variable LR Test Statistic
Work - full time or part time 602.24***
School - full time or part time 353.44***
***Signiﬁcant at 1%.








*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at
5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust stan-
dard errors are corrected for clustering
at the year-state level.












*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at
5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust stan-
dard errors are corrected for clustering
at the year-state level.












The change in child labor and schooling
is in percentage points.
30Table 5: Rates of Return to Education, Child Labor, and Schooling: Without Correcting








*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at
5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
31Table 6: Rates of Return to Education & Child Labor: Excluding Children Engaged in








*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signif-
icant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at
1%. Standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering at the
year-state level.
32Table 7: Rates of Return to Education, Full Time Work, Full Time School, & Part Time
Work & School
Full Time Full Time Part Time
Work School Work & School
Girls
Primary 0.0147 -0.0498 -0.0011
Middle -0.0488 0.0710 -0.0011***
Boys
Primary -0.2710** 0.6581*** -0.0022*
Middle -0.0681 0.1147 0.0002
*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at
1%. Standard errors are not corrected for clustering at the
year-state level.









*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at
5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
34Table 9: Rates of Return to Education & Child Labor: Including Rates of Return to












*Signiﬁcant at 10%, **Signiﬁcant at
5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
35A APPENDIX
1. CORRECTION OF WAGE EQUATIONS FOR SAMPLE SELECTION
BIAS
Consider the following equations for the earnings regression (Equation 11a) and the
selection process into wage employment (Equation 11b):20
ys = xsβs + µs (11a)
y
∗
s = zsγs + ηs (11b)
where ys is earnings (the outcome variable) and y∗
s is employment status (the selection
variable) and s is a categorical variable representing an individual’s choice between M
alternatives, s = 1,...,M. The variables xs and zs are exogenous, where xs is a subset of
zs in order to identify the earnings equation. The error term in the earnings regression,
µs, has E (µs|x,z) = 0 and V (µs|x,z) = σ2.












Equation 12 is equivalent to:










Assume now that the η’s are independent and identically Gumbel distributed. Thus,
their cumulative and density functions are respectively G(η) = exp(−e−η) and g (η) =
20The i subscript for individuals is suppressed.
36exp(−η − e−η). As shown by McFadden (1974), this speciﬁcation leads to the multino-
mial logit model with:
P (y
∗






s) is the probability that category s was chosen. Based on this expression,
maximum likelihood estimates of the γj’s can be easily obtained.
Because the error terms µs and ηs’s are correlated, ordinary least squares estimates
of βs are inconsistent. To obtain consistent estimates of β4, since the observed outcome
belongs to category s = 4, Bourguignon et al. (2001) propose estimating the following
model. Deﬁne the following standard normal variables for s = 1,...,4:
η
∗
s = J (ηs) = Φ
−1 (G(ηs)) (16)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. For every s, assume that the
expected values of µ4 and η∗
s are linearly related. If ˜ ρs is the correlation coeﬃcient
between µ4 and η∗






s is the correlation between µ4 and η∗
s, σ4
is the standard deviation of µ4, and ση∗
s is the standard deviation of η∗
s) then µ4 can be







s + ω4 (17)
where ω4 is an error term which is orthogonal to all the η∗
s’s and E (ω4) = 0. This
expression uses the fact that the η∗
s’s are independent from each other. In order to make
the earnings regression, 11a, estimable through ordinary least squares for s = 4, it is
necessary to know the expectation of µ4 conditional on the fact that category s = 4 is






















































































J (η4)g (η4 + logP4)dη4 (20)
where Ps = P (y∗

















J (v − logP4)g (v)dv (21)
For η∗











































Let v = ηs + logPs and notice that
R
J (ηs)g (ηs)dηs = E (η∗


















J (v − logPs)g (v)dv (23)
For convenience, let m(Ps) =
R
J (v − logPs)g (v)dv,∀s. Substituting equations 21 and























38Replacing the error term in the earnings regression (Equation 11a) by its conditional
expected value (Equation 24) and a residual term (ν4) gives:











where ˜ ρs is the correlation coeﬃcient between µ4 and η∗





, Ps = P (y∗
s)
is the probability that category s was chosen, m(Ps) =
R
J (v − logPs)g (v)dv, v =
ηs + logPs, and J (◦) = Φ−1 (G(◦)), for s = 1,...,4.
The error term ν4 is now orthogonal to all other terms on the RHS and has zero
expectation. Because of this property ordinary least squares may now be used to provide
consistent estimates of the β4’s, (σ4˜ ρ1), (σ4˜ ρ2), (σ4˜ ρ3), and (σ4˜ ρ4).21 The selectivity
correction within the multinomial logit setup involves all correlation coeﬃcients between
the disturbance term of the earnings equation (µ4) and the disturbance terms of all
categorical latent expressions (η∗
s for s = 1,...,4).
In terms of practical implementation, the method consists of two steps. First, es-
timate the multinomial logit, and derive from it the predicted probabilities ˆ Ps’s using
the ˆ γs’s. The integrals m(Ps) have no analytical solution as functions of Ps, so they
must be computed numerically. This is not a source of computational complexity, how-
ever, as it must be done only once for each observation. In the Stata ado program
Bourguignon et al. (2001) compute these numerical integrals using the Gauss-Laguerre
quadrature method. The abscissas and weight factors used in the program are from
Davis & Polonsky (1964). Second, estimate Equation 25 by ordinary least squares.
21Note that in the second stage, if one is interested in the values of ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ2, ˜ ρ3, and ˜ ρ4, full identiﬁcation
is provided by estimating σ4 from the residuals of the earnings equation (Equation 11a) where σ4 is
the standard deviation of µ4. More directly, non-linear least squares may also be used.
392. TABLES
Table 1: Regional and Social Disparities in Literacy Rates in India, 2001
Region/State/Caste Gender
Male Female Total
Urban 86.42 72.99 80.06
Rural 71.18 46.58 59.21
Kerala 94.20 87.86 90.92
Bihar 60.32 33.57 47.53
Scheduled Castes 49.91 23.76 37.41
Scheduled Tribes 40.65 18.10 29.60
India 75.64 54.03 65.20




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Table 6: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Dependent Variables
ChildLabor − ftpt 0.2926 0.4550
School − ftpt 0.6522 0.4763
ChildLabor − ft 0.2643 0.4409
School − ft 0.6271 0.4836
ChildLabor&School − pt 0.0251 0.1564
Independent Variables
Rate − Primary 0.0384 0.0698
Rate − Middle 0.0587 0.1514
Rate − High 0.1288 0.1753
Rate − College 0.1175 0.1741
Y ear − 83 0.2726 0.4453
Y ear − 88 0.2714 0.4447
Y ear − 93 0.2212 0.4151
Y ear − 99 0.2348 0.4238
Children 4.0250 1.7634
Father − None 0.5321 0.4990
Father − Primary 0.1485 0.3556
Father − Middle 0.1289 0.3351
Father − High 0.1333 0.3399
Father − College 0.0572 0.2322
Mother − None 0.7409 0.4381
Mother − Primary 0.1052 0.3068
Mother − Middle 0.0755 0.2643
Mother − High 0.0587 0.2351









July − Sep 0.2492 0.4325
Oct − Dec 0.2523 0.4343
Jan − March 0.2476 0.4316
April − June 0.2509 0.4335
Male 0.5287 0.4992
Source: NSSO Data, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999.
Per capita monthly household expenditure (LogExpenditure) is adjusted to
1988 Rupees.
45Table 7: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0358 0.1081 -0.4042 0.1723**
Rate − Middle -0.1014 0.0527* 0.0498 0.0797
Y ear − 88 0.2824 0.0244*** 0.0009 0.0158
Y ear − 93 0.2284 0.0248*** 0.0020 0.0174
Y ear − 99 0.2021 0.0222*** 0.0402 0.0166**
Children 0.0205 0.0037*** 0.0036 0.0011***
Father − Primary -0.1107 0.0058*** 0.0074 0.0054
Father − Middle -0.1420 0.0070*** 0.0063 0.0062
Father − High -0.1750 0.0085*** 0.0252 0.0067***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0097*** 0.0067 0.0115
Mother − Primary -0.0998 0.0061*** 0.0703 0.0082***
Mother − Middle -0.0908 0.0087*** 0.0760 0.0099***
Mother − High -0.0685 0.0150*** 0.0866 0.0129***
Mother − College -0.0476 0.0177** 0.0948 0.0187***
WorkingMother 0.0630 0.0070*** -0.0225 0.0062***
LogExpenditure -0.0784 0.0075*** 0.0046 0.0053
Asset -0.0070 0.0075 -0.0155 0.0056***
Age -0.1567 0.0151*** -0.0302 0.0046***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0797 0.0062*** 0.0318 0.0062***
Lowcaste 0.0514 0.0058*** 0.0020 0.0046
Muslim 0.0563 0.0108*** 0.0034 0.0076
Oct − Dec -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0031 0.0052
Jan − March -0.0204 0.0062*** -0.0036 0.0051





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
46Table 8: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling (Cor-
recting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.1031 0.1119 0.5693 0.1540***
Rate − Middle 0.0174 0.0439 0.1168 0.0591**
Y ear − 88 0.0491 0.0142*** -0.0185 0.0225
Y ear − 93 0.1432 0.0135*** -0.0077 0.0221
Y ear − 99 0.1903 0.0111*** -0.0547 0.0208***
Children 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0012
Father − Primary 0.1480 0.0044*** -0.0201 0.0048***
Father − Middle 0.1856 0.0049*** -0.0151 0.0061**
Father − High 0.2207 0.0070*** -0.0221 0.0066***
Father − College 0.2274 0.0075*** -0.0168 0.0131
Mother − Primary 0.1308 0.0057*** -0.0737 0.0088
Mother − Middle 0.1377 0.0067*** -0.0894 0.0111
Mother − High 0.1250 0.0097*** -0.0812 0.0136
Mother − College 0.1226 0.0162*** -0.1180 0.0252
WorkingMother -0.0788 0.0073*** 0.0401 0.0076
LogExpenditure 0.1277 0.0059*** -0.0112 0.0062*
Asset 0.0113 0.007 0.0220 0.0057***
Age 0.2619 0.0092*** 0.0335 0.0046***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0086*** -0.0517 0.0080***
Lowcaste -0.0633 0.0062*** -0.0066 0.0058
Muslim -0.1041 0.0117*** -0.0095 0.0092
Oct − Dec -0.0100 0.0051* -0.0041 0.0054
Jan − March 0.0086 0.0052 -0.0009 0.0048





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
47Table 9: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Without Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Standard Error Interaction Standard Error
with Male Dummy
Rate − Primary -0.0358 0.0173** -0.4042 0.0311***
Rate − Middle -0.1014 0.0079*** 0.0498 0.0131***
Y ear − 88 0.2824 0.0032*** 0.0009 0.0040
Y ear − 93 0.2284 0.0036*** 0.0020 0.0045
Y ear − 99 0.2021 0.0037*** 0.0402 0.0048***
Children 0.0205 0.0005*** 0.0036 0.0007***
Father − Primary -0.1107 0.0023*** 0.0074 0.0042*
Father − Middle -0.1420 0.0024*** 0.0063 0.0049
Father − High -0.1750 0.0025*** 0.0252 0.0059***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0035*** 0.0067 0.0096
Mother − Primary -0.0998 0.0030*** 0.0703 0.0061***
Mother − Middle -0.0908 0.0039*** 0.0760 0.0078***
Mother − High -0.0685 0.0053*** 0.0866 0.0099***
Mother − College -0.0476 0.0098*** 0.0948 0.0178***
WorkingMother 0.0630 0.0023*** -0.0225 0.0029***
LogExpenditure -0.0784 0.0021*** 0.0046 0.0030
Asset -0.0070 0.0025*** -0.0155 0.0034***
Age -0.1567 0.0026*** -0.0302 0.0036***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0001*** 0.0006 0.0001***
Urban -0.0797 0.0025*** 0.0318 0.0039***
Lowcaste 0.0514 0.0024*** 0.0020 0.0032
Muslim 0.0563 0.0032*** 0.0034 0.0041
Oct − Dec -0.0051 0.0027* -0.0031 0.0038
Jan − March -0.0204 0.0027*** -0.0036 0.0039





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Standard errors, not corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
48Table 10: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling (With-
out Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Standard Error Interaction Standard Error
with Male Dummy
Rate − Primary -0.1031 0.0193*** 0.5693 0.0343***
Rate − Middle 0.0174 0.0089* 0.1168 0.0143***
Y ear − 88 0.0491 0.0029*** -0.0185 0.0042***
Y ear − 93 0.1432 0.0028*** -0.0077 0.0047
Y ear − 99 0.1903 0.0027*** -0.0547 0.0051***
Children 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0008
Father − Primary 0.1480 0.0025*** -0.0201 0.0046***
Father − Middle 0.1856 0.0025*** -0.0151 0.0054***
Father − High 0.2207 0.0027*** -0.0221 0.0064***
Father − College 0.2274 0.0037*** -0.0168 0.0114
Mother − Primary 0.1308 0.0033*** -0.0737 0.0065***
Mother − Middle 0.1377 0.0042*** -0.0894 0.0088***
Mother − High 0.1250 0.0057*** -0.0812 0.0116***
Mother − College 0.1226 0.0108*** -0.1180 0.0224***
WorkingMother -0.0788 0.0025*** 0.0401 0.0031***
LogExpenditure 0.1277 0.0024*** -0.0112 0.0033***
Asset 0.0113 0.0028*** 0.0220 0.0037***
Age 0.2619 0.0029*** 0.0335 0.0040***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0001*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0027*** -0.0517 0.0042***
Lowcaste -0.0633 0.0027*** -0.0066 0.0036*
Muslim -0.1041 0.0036*** -0.0095 0.0045**
Oct − Dec -0.0100 0.0031*** -0.0041 0.0043
Jan − March 0.0086 0.0031*** -0.0009 0.0043





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Standard errors, not corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
49Table 11: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Excluding Domestic Chores from Child Labor)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0687 0.0875 -0.2198 0.1528
Rate − Middle -0.1108 0.0403*** 0.0984 0.0652
Y ear − 88 0.3781 0.0277*** -0.0733 0.0108***
Y ear − 93 0.3415 0.0276*** -0.0740 0.0106***
Y ear − 99 0.3426 0.0275*** -0.0644 0.0110***
Children 0.0217 0.0032*** -0.0002 0.0009
Father − Primary -0.0834 0.0046*** -0.0079 0.0044*
Father − Middle -0.1043 0.0057*** -0.0142 0.0050***
Father − High -0.1238 0.0076*** -0.0115 0.0058*
Father − College -0.1208 0.0090*** -0.0354 0.0088***
Mother − Primary -0.0654 0.0055*** 0.0291 0.0065***
Mother − Middle -0.0542 0.0082*** 0.0257 0.0074***
Mother − High -0.0367 0.0132*** 0.0387 0.0097***
Mother − College -0.0257 0.0156 0.0514 0.0159***
WorkingMother 0.0646 0.0084*** -0.0289 0.0066***
LogExpenditure -0.0603 0.0069*** -0.0029 0.0052
Asset -0.0004 0.0066 -0.0217 0.0046***
Age -0.1174 0.0090*** -0.0528 0.0068***
Agesq 0.0053 0.0003*** 0.0034 0.0003***
Urban -0.0537 0.0050*** 0.0145 0.0048***
Lowcaste 0.0437 0.0052*** -0.0012 0.0041
Muslim 0.0334 0.0106*** 0.0149 0.0072**
Oct − Dec -0.0010 0.0062 -0.0046 0.0052
Jan − March -0.0076 0.0068 -0.0101 0.0043**





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
50Table 12: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time Child Labor
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary 0.0147 0.0840 -0.2857 0.1419**
Rate − Middle -0.0488 0.0405 -0.0193 0.0625
Y ear − 88 0.2857 0.0203*** -0.0013 0.0146
Y ear − 93 0.1839 0.0234*** -0.0040 0.0171
Y ear − 99 0.1331 0.0198*** 0.0312 0.0148**
Children -0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0010
Father − Primary -0.1003 0.0051*** 0.0034 0.0047
Father − Middle -0.1321 0.0060*** 0.0024 0.0055
Father − High -0.1606 0.0072*** 0.0144 0.0060**
Father − College -0.1631 0.0081*** 0.0112 0.0123
Mother − Primary -0.1032 0.0042*** 0.0639 0.0080***
Mother − Middle -0.1117 0.0058*** 0.0778 0.0108***
Mother − High -0.1083 0.0080*** 0.0880 0.0134***
Mother − College -0.1074 0.0113*** 0.1137 0.0236***
WorkingMother 0.0564 0.0057*** -0.0210 0.0057***
LogExpenditure -0.0852 0.0071*** -0.0018 0.0048
Asset -0.0053 0.0064 -0.0146 0.0053***
Age -0.1527 0.0150*** -0.0297 0.0042***
Agesq 0.0087 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0744 0.0055*** 0.0298 0.0061***
Lowcaste 0.0448 0.0057*** 0.0044 0.0046
Muslim 0.0745 0.0090*** 0.0077 0.0068
Oct − Dec 0.0129 0.0038*** 0.0020 0.0049
Jan − March 0.0029 0.0039 0.0027 0.0046





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
51Table 13: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time Schooling
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0498 0.1408 0.7079 0.1893***
Rate − Middle 0.0710 0.0607 0.0437 0.0787
Y ear − 88 0.0624 0.0224*** -0.0246 0.0226
Y ear − 93 0.1123 0.0205*** -0.0178 0.0217
Y ear − 99 0.1385 0.0222*** -0.0666 0.0212***
Children -0.0229 0.0044*** -0.0025 0.0012**
Father − Primary 0.1551 0.0056*** -0.0233 0.0051***
Father − Middle 0.1908 0.0071*** -0.0192 0.0065***
Father − High 0.2300 0.0095*** -0.0345 0.0069***
Father − College 0.2356 0.0107*** -0.0130 0.0121
Mother − Primary 0.1220 0.0076*** -0.0761 0.0089***
Mother − Middle 0.1056 0.0104*** -0.0814 0.0103***
Mother − High 0.0684 0.0175*** -0.0784 0.0130***
Mother − College 0.0362 0.0224 -0.0895 0.0198***
WorkingMother -0.0791 0.0086*** 0.0380 0.0079***
LogExpenditure 0.1120 0.0080*** -0.0148 0.0063**
Asset 0.0104 0.0084 0.0216 0.0061***
Age 0.2548 0.0096*** 0.0329 0.0048***
Agesq -0.0131 0.0004*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0095*** -0.0494 0.0080***
Lowcaste -0.0661 0.0069*** -0.0046 0.0058
Muslim -0.0795 0.0143*** -0.0055 0.0097
Oct − Dec 0.0106 0.0073 0.0004 0.0059
Jan − March 0.0350 0.0072*** 0.0041 0.0053





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
52Table 14: Probit Estimates for Participation in Part Time Child Labor & Schooling
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0011 0.0013
Rate − Middle -0.0011 0.0004*** 0.0013 0.0008*
Y ear − 88 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002
Y ear − 93 0.0455 0.0145*** -0.0004 0.0001**
Y ear − 99 0.0626 0.0163*** -0.0004 0.0001**
Children 0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Father − Primary 0.0003 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000
Father − Middle 0.0004 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000***
Father − High 0.0002 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Father − College 0.0002 0.0001*** -0.0002 0.0000**
Mother − Primary 0.0004 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000***
Mother − Middle 0.0005 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000**
Mother − High 0.0008 0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0000
Mother − College 0.0013 0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0000
WorkingMother 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
LogExpenditure 0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Asset -0.0001 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000
Age 0.0002 0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0000**
Agesq 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000**
Urban -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Lowcaste 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000***
Muslim -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Oct − Dec -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Jan − March -0.0005 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
53Table 15: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor -
Excluding LogExpenditure
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0402 0.1078 -0.4080 0.1724**
Rate − Middle -0.1021 0.0527* 0.0548 0.0794
Y ear − 88 0.2592 0.0240*** 0.0026 0.0158
Y ear − 93 0.1987 0.0242*** 0.0035 0.0171
Y ear − 99 0.1572 0.0221*** 0.0412 0.0166**
Children 0.0237 0.0037*** 0.0035 0.0010***
Father − Primary -0.1173 0.0059*** 0.0078 0.0053
Father − Middle -0.1510 0.0072*** 0.0070 0.0062
Father − High -0.1883 0.0086*** 0.0262 0.0064***
Father − College -0.1922 0.0093*** 0.0080 0.0109
Mother − Primary -0.1057 0.0062*** 0.0709 0.0082***
Mother − Middle -0.1001 0.0088*** 0.0774 0.0098***
Mother − High -0.0868 0.0144*** 0.0884 0.0125***
Mother − College -0.0840 0.0162*** 0.0975 0.0179***
WorkingMother 0.0689 0.0070*** -0.0227 0.0061***
Asset -0.0135 0.0074* -0.0141 0.0057**
Age -0.1566 0.0150*** -0.0304 0.0046***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0914 0.0060*** 0.0327 0.0061***
Lowcaste 0.0614 0.0064*** 0.0020 0.0047
Muslim 0.0587 0.0109*** 0.0036 0.0076
Oct − Dec -0.0055 0.0061 -0.0036 0.0052
Jan − March -0.0212 0.0062*** -0.0038 0.0051





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
54Table 16: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling -
Excluding LogExpenditure
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0937 0.1113 0.5789 0.1561***
Rate − Middle 0.0195 0.0439 0.1085 0.0596*
Y ear − 88 0.0775 0.0138*** -0.0217 0.0225
Y ear − 93 0.1742 0.0124*** -0.0105 0.0219
Y ear − 99 0.2352 0.0101*** -0.0568 0.0212***
Children -0.0043 0.0015*** -0.0008 0.0011
Father − Primary 0.1579 0.0044*** -0.0208 0.0046***
Father − Middle 0.1991 0.0049*** -0.0166 0.0058***
Father − High 0.2407 0.0067*** -0.0245 0.0063***
Father − College 0.2489 0.0065*** -0.0193 0.0122
Mother − Primary 0.1401 0.0057*** -0.0752 0.0088***
Mother − Middle 0.1513 0.0066*** -0.0912 0.0109***
Mother − High 0.1507 0.0089*** -0.0850 0.0133***
Mother − College 0.1694 0.0128*** -0.1219 0.0241***
WorkingMother -0.0876 0.0073*** 0.0403 0.0074***
Asset 0.0213 0.0071*** 0.0197 0.0057***
Age 0.2601 0.0091*** 0.0341 0.0045***
Agesq -0.0133 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1276 0.0081*** -0.0532 0.0081***
Lowcaste -0.0789 0.0067*** -0.0070 0.0058
Muslim -0.1067 0.0116*** -0.0100 0.0092
Oct − Dec -0.0090 0.0052* -0.0034 0.0054
Jan − March 0.0104 0.0053* -0.0007 0.0048





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
55Table 17: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor -
Including Rates of Return to High School & College
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0145 0.1071 -0.5241 0.2092**
Rate − Middle -0.0861 0.0528 0.0475 0.0818
Rate − High 0.0342 0.0367 0.1215 0.1282
Rate − College 0.0244 0.0358 0.1217 0.0964
Y ear − 88 0.2812 0.0242*** 0.0054 0.0163
Y ear − 93 0.2300 0.0245*** -0.0082 0.0185
Y ear − 99 0.2000 0.0221*** 0.0295 0.0189
Children 0.0203 0.0037*** 0.0038 0.0011***
Father − Primary -0.1110 0.0057*** 0.0081 0.0054
Father − Middle -0.1423 0.0069*** 0.0070 0.0061
Father − High -0.1751 0.0085*** 0.0251 0.0065***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0097*** 0.0064 0.0112
Mother − Primary -0.1002 0.0061*** 0.0714 0.0083***
Mother − Middle -0.0915 0.0086*** 0.0771 0.0100***
Mother − High -0.0691 0.0150*** 0.0875 0.0128***
Mother − College -0.0482 0.0176** 0.0957 0.0186***
WorkingMother 0.0636 0.0070*** -0.0240 0.0064***
LogExpenditure -0.0783 0.0075*** 0.0048 0.0053
Asset -0.0079 0.0075 -0.0143 0.0056**
Age -0.1566 0.0151*** -0.0302 0.0047***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0793 0.0062*** 0.0308 0.0064***
Lowcaste 0.0505 0.0058*** 0.0036 0.0048
Muslim 0.0560 0.0110*** 0.0035 0.0079
Oct − Dec -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0029 0.0051
Jan − March -0.0204 0.0062*** -0.0034 0.0049





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
56Table 18: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling -
Including Rates of Return to High School & College
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate − Primary -0.0755 0.1175 0.5590 0.1664***
Rate − Middle 0.0300 0.0450 0.1118 0.0651*
Rate − High 0.0307 0.0280 -0.0592 0.0773
Rate − College 0.0184 0.0288 -0.0193 0.0613
Y ear − 88 0.0479 0.0147*** -0.0177 0.0228
Y ear − 93 0.1442 0.0121*** -0.0072 0.0194
Y ear − 99 0.1884 0.0113*** -0.0508 0.0218**
Children 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0012
Father − Primary 0.1477 0.0044*** -0.0196 0.0048***
Father − Middle 0.1854 0.0049*** -0.0147 0.0060**
Father − High 0.2206 0.0069*** -0.0217 0.0066***
Father − College 0.2273 0.0075*** -0.0163 0.0132
Mother − Primary 0.1306 0.0057*** -0.0733 0.0088***
Mother − Middle 0.1376 0.0068*** -0.0889 0.0110***
Mother − High 0.1247 0.0097*** -0.0806 0.0134***
Mother − College 0.1222 0.0162*** -0.1171 0.0252***
WorkingMother -0.0786 0.0073*** 0.0397 0.0076***
LogExpenditure 0.1285 0.0059*** -0.0127 0.0061**
Asset 0.0114 0.0069* 0.0218 0.0054***
Age 0.2619 0.0092*** 0.0334 0.0046***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1105 0.0086*** -0.0521 0.0081***
Lowcaste -0.0630 0.0063*** -0.0073 0.0059
Muslim -0.1048 0.0118*** -0.0084 0.0092
Oct − Dec -0.0101 0.0052* -0.0039 0.0054
Jan − March 0.0086 0.0052 -0.0008 0.0047





Marginal eﬀects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Signiﬁcant at 10%,
**Signiﬁcant at 5%, ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
57